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UNION RECEIVERSHIPS UNDER RICO: A UNION
DEMOCRACY PERSPECTIVE
ERIC AMES TILLESt
[T]he question we have to discuss is not whether ideal de-
mocracy is realizable, but rather to what point and in what
degree democracy is desirable, possible, and realizable
INTRODUCTION
Corrupt labor unions have plagued union members, employers,
and the American public since the late 1800s.' In the twentieth cen-
tury, racketeering and corruption spread through the building trade un-
ions in New York,' New Jersey,4 and Chicago,' and through the nee-
dle,' culinary,7 building services," and theatre employees' unions. 9
During three years of Senate hearings in the 1950s, over 1500 wit-
nesses provided more than 46,000 pages of testimony describing union
acts of violence, extortion, theft, and bribery.1" Much of this testimony
was devoted to the corrupt practices of the International Brotherhood of
t B.S. 1985, New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations at Cornell
University; J.D. Candidate 1989, University of Pennsylvania. I would like to thank
Professors Clyde Summers and Susan Sturm for their assistance, patience, and advice. I
also thank Professor George Brooks for introducing me to the subject of union
democracy.
I R. MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE OLIGAR-
CHICAL TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY 366 (1962).
2 See Hutchinson, The Anatomy of Corruption in Trade Unions, 8 INDUS. REL.
135, 135 (1969).
3 See J. HUTCHINSON, THE IMPERFECT UNION 28-47 (1970).
" See id. at 48-52.
5 See id. at 53-61.
1 See id. at 74-92.
7 See id. at 118-23.
1 See id. at 124-29. Most recently, the New York Court of Appeals upheld the
subpoena of the names, telephone and social security numbers of 10,000 members of
the carpenters' union locals in an attempt to fight corruption in the construction indus-
try. See Crowne, Subpoenas Upheld in Probe of Union, N.Y.L.J., July 7, 1988, at 1,
col. 3. The court held that release of the names to the prosecutors would allow mem-
bers to be contacted directly "without exposing witnesses to possible intimidation." Id.
col. 4; see also Gillespie, A.C. Union Chief Took Bribes Prosecutor Says, Philadelphia
Inquirer, June 8, 1988, at 7B, col. 1 (alleging that the business manager of the Iron-
workers accepted cash payments for favors).
9 See J. HUTCHINSON, supra note 3, at 130-38.
10 See id. at 7.
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Teamsters."'
In 1959, Congress passed the Landrum-Griffin Act.'" Legislators
designed the Act to fight corruption by enabling union members to re-
take control of their unions through democratic processes.' Corruption,
however, persisted. Senate hearings in 1981 revealed that the problem
of labor racketeering in Newark and Buffalo equalled that in the
1950s" ' and that in Chicago, organized crime controlled "nearly every
major local union of three international unions."' 5 Strike force attor-
neys described the problem in the Eastern District of New York as
"pervasive" and in Philadelphia as "awesome."'" Most recently, the
President's Commission on Organized Crime concluded that organized
crime runs several hundred locals "embracing thousands of members in
strategic cities."'"
The Justice Department has brought suits against corrupt local
union leaders'" under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act ("RICO")' 9 as part of an effort to return control of the un-
ions to their members. In these suits, the prosecutor seeks to remove the
union's elected officials and impose a court-appointed trustee to run the
union. 0 If the government prevails, the court gives a trustee sole re-
sponsibility for managing the union until the court determines that the
I" See S. ROMER, THE INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS 101
(1962) (thirty-four of the fifty-eight volumes of testimony described corrupt Teamster
practices).
2 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959,
29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1982).
1S See 105 CONG. REC. 6471-72 (statement of Sen. McClellan), reprinted in 2
NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND Dis-
CLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 1198-99 (1959) [hereinafter NLRB LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY].
4 See Government's Ability to Combat Labor Management Racketeering: Hear-
ings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Gov-
ernmental Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 234 (1982).
15 Id. at 236.
16 Id. at 242.
17 'PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, ORGANIZED CRIME AND
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RACKETEERING IN THE UNITED STATES, RECORD OF HEAR-
ING VI, APRIL 22-24, 1985, at 7-8 (1985) (hereinafter ORGANIZED CRIME).
18 See, e.g., United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267 (3d
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986); United States v. Local 30, United
Slate, Tile & Composition Roofers, 686 F. Supp. 1139 (E.D. Pa. 1988); United States
v. Local 6A, Cement and Concrete Workers, 663 F. Supp. 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
19 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
20 A receiver "is a trustee or ministerial officer representing the court, and all
parties in interest in litigation, and property or fund intrusted to him." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1140 (5th ed. 1979). A court has a number of options when imposing a
receiver on a union. The receiver can be given a range of responsibilities ranging from
total control over the union to mere monitoring of union activities. This Comment will
use "trustee" and "receiver" interchangeably.
[Vol. 137:929
RICO RECEIVERSHIPS
corrupt influence has dissipated and that valid elections can once again
be held. For example, the Justice Department recently filed a com-
plaint to remove the entire Executive Board of the International Broth-
erhood of Teamsters and replace these Board members with a receiver
who will "discharge the duties of the General President and/or Gen-
eral Executive Board . . . . until such time as a free and fair elections
can be held."2
Organized labor is not enthralled with this new use of RICO and
has labelled it "union busting."22 The threatened use of trustees has
transformed the Teamsters into a "one issue union."23 In court, the
union has protested that "[i]t is not the function of the United States to
dictate to members of any union or any private association how they
should react to convictions of past officers or whether they should spurn
officers who their government condemns."2 4 The claim is a sympathetic
one. It is unsettling to think that in a democracy the government can,
and would, take control of a private organization.
Indeed, the Teamsters' declaration reflects the underlying ideal of
labor policy in the United States. Since the Norris-LaGuardia Act25
was passed in 1932, there has been a "very clear Congressional intent
to end injunctive interference in labor relations."2 The Landrum-Grif-
21 Complaint, United States v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Civ. No. 88-4486
(S.D.N.Y. filed June 28, 1988), reprinted in Daily Labor Report No. 125, June 29,
1988, at E-1, E-41 to E-43.
22 See Power, U.S. Court Control Imposed on Roofers, Philadelphia Inquirer,
May 24, 1988, at 1A, 8A, col. 5 (statement of Robert McKee, head of the U.S. Labor
Department's Office of Labor Racketeering, referring to the views of the union hierar-
chy. McKee personally supported the government's action); Noble, Vote Set to End
U.S. Control of a Jersey Teamsters Local, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1988, at B3, col. 2
(stating that most of the labor movement, notably Lane Kirkland, has "condemned the
trusteeship concept"); see also G. TYLER, THE POLITICAL IMPERATIVE 260 (1968)
(noting that the "leadership is resentful" when the government attempts to regulate any
aspect of union functions). At least one commentator has argued that conspiracy theo-
ries have traditionally been used as "weapons against labor unions." See Casteguera,
The Doctrines of Civil and Criminal Conspiracy as "Union Busting": Techniques in
Labor Law Past and Present, 8 T. MARSHALL L.J. 1, 2 n.7 (1982).
23 The Teamsters Rumble Back, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 30, 1987, at 54 (quoting Barry
Feinstein, director of the Teamsters' Public-Employee division, who stated that the
union's only political concern is fighting the government takeover).
24 Memorandum of Local 560, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, in Oppo-
sition to a Request for a Preliminary Injunction and the Appointment of a Receiver
Pendente Lite at 141, United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 550 F.
Supp. 511 (D.N.J. 1982) (No. 82-689) [hereinafter Memo in Opposition].
25 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
26 Texas & New Orleans R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 307 F.2d 151,
155 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 952 (1963); cf. Wilson & Co. v. Birl, 105
F.2d 948, 953 (3d Cir. 1939) (injunction may issue only in the case of violence or
fraud).
The lessons learned from organized labor's first experiences with judicial equitable
remedies illustrate the problems with judicial intervention. From the 1880s through the
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fin Act took this policy one step further by applying it to the internal
affairs of labor organizations. The report issued by the Senate Commit-
tee on Labor and Public Welfare recognized "the desirability of mini-
mum interference by government" in the internal affairs of unions.27
The bill's sponsor echoed this concern during the debate: "If we want
fewer laws ... [w]e should give union members their inherent constitu-
tional rights, and we should make those rights apply to union member-
ship . . . . By so doing we will be giving them the tools they can use
themselves."28
Thus, in the area of labor racketeering, fundamental policy con-
cerns collide. The government's need to protect both union members
and the public conflicts with the legislative directive to let unions man-
age themselves. This Comment will focus on the tension created by
these inconsistent policy goals and the role union democracy plays in
harmonizing them. For despite its undesirability, intrusive government
intervention is necessary to fight corrupt union leadership. Past at-
tempts, both statutory and judicial, failed to satisfy either policy goal
because they did not fully acknowledge that corrupt leadership has in-
timidated union members and employers so that they do not dare assert
their statutory rights. This Comment concludes that intrusive interven-
tion, particularly in the form of receivers, is the only remedy that will
simultaneously protect the rights of society and union members, while
1920s, courts issued over 1,800 injunctions against striking unions. See E. WrrTE, THE
GOVERNMENT IN LABOR DIsPUTEs 84 (1932). It took the passage of the Norris-La-
Guardia Act, which substantially restricted the jurisdiction federal courts had to issue
labor injunctions, to curb this abuse of judicial discretion. See C. SUMMERS, H. WEL-
LINGTON & A. HYDE, LABOR LAW 223 (2d ed. 1982). Indeed, at the time of its pas-
sage, RICO was said to "run[] amuck .... [iut employs penalties and investigative
procedures which are both abusive and pregnant with the potential for abuse." Dissent-
ing Views of Representatives John Conyers, Jr., Abner Mikva, and William F. Ryan,
on the Organized Crime Control Act, H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., re-
printed in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4007, 4081.
The labor injunctions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries can be
distinguished to some extent from the current RICO suits in that they were concerned
with union-management relations, not internal union affairs, and in that the primary
problem with injunctions was procedural: They relied on ex parte hearings. See F.
FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNcTION 202 (1963). This Comment
argues that the primary concern over RICO should be substantive: When, if ever, is a
receiver warranted? Implicit in this question is a determination of what authority a
receiver should be granted.
17 S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 2318, 2323. Some members of Congress still feel that it is inappropri-
ate for the government to interfere in the internal affairs of labor unions. In response to
the Justice Department suit against the Teamsters, Senator Orrin Hatch stated that the
suit "flies in the face of democratic principles" and "smacks of totalitarianism." Daily
Laboi Report No. 125, June 29, 1988, at A-5.
28 105 CONG. REC. 6476 (1959) (statement of Sen. McClellan), reprinted in 2
NLRB LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 13, at 1103.
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still preserving the union as an institution.
Part I of this Comment analyzes the model of union democracy
incorporated in the Landrum-Griffin Act. It explains why union de-
mocracy is an elusive goal and why the democratic processes incorpo-
rated in the Landrum-Griffin Act are not equal to the task of cleaning
up a corrupt union. Part II elucidates the statutory basis of recent Jus-
tice Department suits directed at imposing a trustee on a union and
derives the theories under which the government believes it is appropri-
ate to do so. Part III evaluates the use of trustees and receivers in light
of historical experience, alternative remedies, and union democracy con-
cerns; it concludes that the courts have not adequately weighed the in-
terests of rank and file members when imposing a receiver on a union.
I. UNION DEMOCRACY
The Landrum-Griffin Act 9 provides a statutory basis for analyz-
ing union democracy. Congress passed Landrum-Griffin in response to
a belief that corrupt and undemocratic unions represented a threat to
the country and in response to a perceived lack of democracy in Ameri-
can labor unions.3 Congressional investigations supported this percep-
tion with evidence of numerous "instances of breach of trust, corrup-
tion, disregard of the rights of individual employees, and other failures
to observe high standards of responsibility and ethical conduct."3 The
legislation gives a broad mandate: "[A]ll unions should be run in a
democratic manner regardless of the absence or presence of corrup-
tion." 2 Achieving this goal requires "vest[ing] in [the worker] . .. the
power to do something to protect his rights .... [and] enable him to
prevent usurpation by would-be exploiters."33
Indeed, the Landrum-Griffin Act primarily aims to encourage the
"full and active participation by the rank and file in the affairs of the
union."3 4 To accomplish this goal, the statute provides for equal rights
29 Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959,
29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1982).
" See Note, Title I and Union Democracy, 12 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE
449, 449-52 (1984).
31 29 U.S.C. § 401(b) (1982).
32 Note, supra note 30, at 452.
31 105 CONG. REc. 6478 (1959) (statement of Sen. McClellan), reprinted in 2
NLRB LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 13, at 1105.
"' American Fed'n of Musicians v. Wittstein, 379 U.S. 171, 182-83 (1964) (hold-
ing that the implementation of a dues increase under a weighted voting system is not
inconsistent with the legislative goal of full participation by union members).
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among all members and grants rights to ensure democratic processes:3 5
Every member of any labor organization shall have the right
to meet and assemble freely with other members; and to ex-
press any views, arguments, or opinions; and to express at
meetings of the labor organization his views, upon candidates
in an election of the labor organization or upon any business
properly before the meeting .... 36
The Act's underlying theory assumes that by granting equal rights and
the freedom of speech to all union members, all members will be able
to participate fully in running their union and thus "bring about a
regeneration of union leadership. ' 37 If such a "regeneration" is possi-
ble, both goals of protecting the public welfare and ensuring democrati-
cally run unions could be achieved. A union run democratically by its
membership does not pose a threat to public safety. Merely providing
the tools of democracy, however, has not proved sufficient.3 Congress
realized it needed to go further and provide the strength to use those
tools. The civil remedies of RICO provide such strength.3
In interpreting the Landrum-Griffin Act, the Supreme Court has
stressed the democratic theory forming the foundation of the Act and
compared it to the Bill of Rights: "[T]he legislators intended
§ 101(a)(2) to restate a principal First Amendment value-the right to
speak one's mind without fear of reprisal. '40 The efficiency of union
administration, therefore, does not outweigh the members' rights to a
democratic union.4 '
Because the right to speak means little without the corollary right
to obtain the data to inform the speech, courts have interpreted Title I
as granting a right more expansive than that granted in the first
amendment. Title I does not merely prohibit union leadership from in-
" See 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(1) (1982) ("Every member of a labor organization
shall have equal rights and privileges . . .
'0 Id. § 411(a)(2).
105 CONG. REC. 6472 (1959) (statement of Sen. McClellan), reprinted in 2
NLRB LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 13, at 1099.
8 See, e.g., infra notes 105-16 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of de-
mocracy and the corrupt practices of Teamsters Local 560); infra notes 139-51 and
accompanying text (discussing corruption in Roofers Local 30/30B).
'9 See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text (discussing civil remedies under
RICO).
40 United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 111 (1982). For a full discus-
sion of the parallels between Title I and the first amendment, see Note, Free Speech
and Union Newspapers: Internal Democracy and Title I Rights, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 485, 504-22 (1985).
41 See Navarro v. Gannon, 385 F.2d 512, 518 (2d Cir. 1967) ("The balance was
struck in favor of union democracy."), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 989 (1968).
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fringing members' rights to speak their mind freely, but also imposes
"the duty to keep the membership informed on matters which they, the
rank and file, must decide." '42
A problem arises when the exercise of these statutory rights must
be interpreted and evaluated. Voluntary organizations have an oligar-
chical tendency. In a study of political parties and unions in Germany
at the beginning of the twentieth century, Robert Michels found that
such a tendency emerged in organizations, even those supposedly com-
mitted to democratic principles, including socialist trade unions and the
Social Democrat Party.43 In short, Michels argued that organizations
must develop hierarchical bureaucracies in order to function properly.
A bureaucracy, however, concentrates the organization's power in the
hands of its leaders, because the leaders have greater access to informa-
tion, control formal communications within the organization, control
organizational expenditures, and are, or become, experienced politi-
cians.44 Michels pessimistically concluded that "[ilt is organization
which gives birth to the dominion of the elected over the electors, of the
mandataries over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators.
Who says organization, says oligarchy.
'4 5
Commentators have applied Michels' analysis to labor unions.46 In
order for a large labor union to run efficiently, the union must develop
a bureaucratic structure.4 Bureaucracy consolidates power in the
hands of the union officers, and it reduces "the sources of organized
42 Blanchard v. Johnson, 388 F. Supp. 208, 214 (N.D. Ohio 1975), modified, 532
F.2d 1074, 1079 (6th Cir.) ("[S]ufficient information about all proposals received by
the Executive Board [must be] disseminated to the membership to allow a reasoned and
informed vote . . ... "), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 869 (1976).
"' See Summers, Democracy in a One-Party State: Perspectives from Landrum-
Griffin, 43 MD. L. REv. 93, 93 (1984).
"' See Lipset, Introduction to R. MICHELS, supra note 1, at 16. Michels has been
criticized for being overly deterministic. See id. at 27-28. In RICO litigation, however,
Michels' analysis provides a strong analytical framework because the corrupt leader-
ship has already taken control of the organization. Cf- infra note 46 (giving examples
of when Michels' analysis has been applied to labor unions).
"I R. MICHELS, supra note 1, at 365; cf. G. TYLER, supra note 22, at 260
("Union leaders are children of the Medici and Tammany .... [Their] Machiavellian
maneuvers ...are on a par with those in church, state, business corporations, and
academia."). Michels called this the "Iron Law of Oligarchy." R MICHELS, supra note
1, at 342.
4" See S. LIPSET, M. TROW & J. COLEMAN, UNION DEMOCRACY 413 (1956); L.
SAYLES & G. STRAUSS, THE LOCAL UNION 167 (1967); Summers, supra note 43, at
96-99.
17 See S. LIPSET, M. TROW & J. COLEMAN, supra note 46, at 9 ("Bureaucracy is
inherent in the sheer problem of administration . .. ."); see also Summers, supra note
43, at 95 ("[U]nion leaders will continue to... create a monolithic bureaucracy... in
the name of efficiency and loyalty.").
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opposition" within the union.4 Both national and local union officers
derive their power from the national union constitution.49 In theory, the
local membership has the power to approve most action taken by the
local's officers." This check on bureaucratic powers is, to a large ex-
tent, non-existent because of low membership attendance at union
meetings."1 In addition, the elected officers hold almost exclusive con-
trol over resources," union communication,5" and patronage positions.
54
Finally, once in power, union officials will view "opposition to union
policies and union leaders ... as disloyalty." '55 These dynamics require
that labor unions, like other organizations, will inevitably fall to
Michels' Iron Law of Oligarchy.
Studies bear out the conclusion that the "Iron Law" exists in
American trade unions. Despite the democratic structures imposed on
unions by Landrum-Griffin, the low rate of turnover in union hierar-
chies continues.56 Further, attendance at meetings normally stabilizes
48 S. LIPSET, M. TROW & J. COLEMAN, supra note 46, at 9; see also Summers,
supra note 43, at 95 ("Union leaders ... will continue to dominate the political struc-
ture . . .[in order to] immobilize[ ] organized opposition."). A typical union bureau-
cracy will consist of a president, vice-president, secretary, treasurer, trustees or execu-
tive board members, and an individual responsible for the actions of the grievance
committee, see W. LEISERSON, AMERICAN TRADE UNION DEMOCRACY 283 (1959),
responsible for the day to day running of the union. Professor Alice Cook has further
argued that, within this group, the power in a labor union will reside with the individ-
ual responsible for administering the contract. See Cook, Dual Government in Unions:
A Tool for Analysis, 15 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 323, 346 (1962).
41 See W. LEISERSON, supra note 48, at 102-11, 283.
11 See id. at 283 (The membership must authorize "nearly every item of the lo-
cal's business.").
" In order to participate, a member must be comfortable with public speaking
and the basics of parliamentary procedure. These factors, as well as the mundane na-
ture of local meetings, contribute to low attendance rates. See infra notes 61-65 and
accompanying text.
52 See Summers, supra note 43, at 97.
See S. LIPSET, M. TRow & J. COLEMAN, supra note 46, at 9; see also Shister,
The Locus of Union Control in Collective Bargaining, 60 Q.J. ECON. 513, 517-18
(1946) (local union dependent on the national office for statistical information and ne-
gotiating powers).
" See Summers, supra note 43, at 97; cf. Cook, supra note 48, at 333 (the ability
to appoint stewards adds to the power of a local president).
" Summers, supra note 43, at 96; see also G. TYLER, supra note 22, at 259
("The unauthorized attempt of any group to oust the 'ins' is treated as heresy, as lese
majesty, or an assault on 'the union.' "). Unions may even adopt rules prohibiting dis-
loyal conduct by members. Members found in violation of such rules face fines or even
expulsion. See W. LEISERSON, supra note 48, at 65.
" See G. TYLER, supra note 22, at 284 ("The sociologic base is not present for
political pluralism. Hence, a union official, once elected, can be re-elected without ma-
jor opposition for decades."); Applebaum & Blaine, The "Iron Law" Revisited: Oli-
garchy in Trade Union Locals, 26 LAB. L.J. 597, 599 (1975). Gus Tyler notes that
low turnover is not limited to union leadership. See G. TYLER, supra note 22, at 284
(discussing Congressmen who have been elected without opposition for decades).
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around a "'hard core' of regular participants"5 of about two to eight
percent of the membership.58 The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed
these figures in a case involving the United Steelworkers.59 The Court
found that the average attendance at six representative locals was just
three and one half percent.60
As may be expected, the larger and more diverse the union, the
greater the influence of the factors that lead to oligarchy. For example,
the structure of large amalgamated unions, which bargain for numer-
ous work places, exacerbates intra-union communication problems.6" In
such a union, a dissatisfied member finds it difficult to determine
whether other members perceive the same problems as she does and to
discover other dissatisfied members who will join with her to voice op-
position.62 In contrast, a small local can maintain open intra-union
communication channels that give "[t]he work of the local . . . a thor-
ough going over."6 3 Large multi-plant agreements, in which the "locus
of control" 64 over the contract does not reside within the individual
57 L. SAYLES & G. STRAUSS, supra note 46, at 99 ("[T]he bulk of the attendance
consists of 'old faithfuls.' ").
58 See id. at 148; see also W. LEISERSON, supra note 48, at 285 (stating that the
range of union member attendance at local meetings was from less than 1% to 84%, but
concluding that average attendance for all locals was less than 10%).
" See Local 3488, United Steelworkers of Am. v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305, 310
(1977) (striking down requirement of attending local meetings for union office eligibil-
ity in order to achieve the goal of free and democratic elections).
60 See id. at 307.
61 See L. SAYLES & G. STRAUSS, supra note 46, at viii.
62 See Summers, supra note 43, at 101 (a primary purpose of Landrum-Griffin is
to permit dissatisfied members to identify other dissatisfied members so they "can take
the first step toward coalescing an organized opposition").
63 L. SAYLES & G. STRAUSS, supra note 46, at 146.
" Id. at 151 (when the "locus of control" has been vested in the international
unions, rank-and-file participation is reduced). Members will, however, derive benefits
from centralized control, see Shister, supra note 53, at 524-25 (noting that centralized
control is beneficial to the local union and the international union because of the advan-
tageous bargaining terms that "national men" can negotiate), or at least perceive that
they do. See infra note 272-73 and accompanying text (discussing siege mentality). The
Teamsters are an extreme example of centralized control. Their constitution provides a
clear example of membership impotence. See, e.g., INT'L BHD. OF TEAMSTERS CONST.
art. VI, § 2(A) (General President interprets the constitution and bylaws and resolves
all internal disputes); id. § 4(A) (General President approves the bylaws of all locals
and subsidiary bodies); id. § 5(A) (General President can impose trustee on locals if he
believes the action is necessary); id. § 9 (General President has sole discretion to spend
union funds for political and lobbying purposes); id. art VII, § 3 (General Executive
Board can change a local's jurisdiction "at any time in its sole discretion"); id. art IX,
§ 9(A) (General Executive Board has discretion to pay all legal defense expenses of
any union member or officer).
In addition, the General President and the General Executive Board control most
significant negotiations. The Teamsters structure requires all locals to join area Joint
Councils. See id. art. XVI, § 2. The Joint Councils have jurisdiction over all member
locals, see id., and the General President appoints the International Directors responsi-
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plants, suffer from inherent problems.
[In] such local unions there is literally no reason for most
members ever to attend any meeting. Let a plant be covered
by a large multi plant contract, let the wage rates be deter-
mined by some technical machinery instead of through "hig-
gling and haggling," let management be assiduous in avoid-
ing formal grievances, and it is difficult to find a local union
meeting, from one year's end to the other, which an intelli-
gent union member ought reasonably to be expected to
attend.
6 5
A number of factors, therefore, lead to union oligarchy. Of these,
the control of the union hierarchy over communications and the unfor-
tunate but understandable lack of union member participation in union
affairs are primarily responsible for the membership's loss of power.
Lack of communications prohibits a full airing of the issues and inhib-
its the formation of interest and opposition groups. Lack of participa-
tion removes most of the internal checks on the union officials' exercise
of discretion.
Thus, few unions could be described as democratic if democracy is
the "institutionalization of opposition" 6 or if it requires the existence
of an "effective organized internal opposition." 7 Given the oligarchic
tendency of organizations in general, it would be unrealistic to impose
such high standards of democracy on labor unions. "But if by democ-
racy one means the responsiveness of the officers to the pressures of the
rank and file, an opportunity for individuals to express themselves, and
a chance to decide basic issues by a majority vote,"6" democratic unions
ble for the Joint Councils. See id. § 3. Further, the General President and Executive
Board control all master agreement negotiations. See id. art. XII, § 2(D) (General
President designates negotiating committees for master agreements); id. § 2(F) (Gen-
eral President and Executive Board can supercede the master negotiating committee
and call ratification or strike votes); id. § 10 (General Executive Board can reject any
proposed collective bargaining agreement).
65 G. BROOKS, THE SOURCES OF VITALrrY IN THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVE-
MENT 7 (1960); see also W. LEISERSON, supra note 48, at 284-85 (noting that the
"routine" nature of the meeting, combined with the requirement to speak publicly in
order to have an impact on the meeting, leads to low member turnout); Cook, supra
note 48, at 332 (noting the local union meeting is "ritualistic" and serves "no signifi-
cant governmental function").
66 S. LiPsET, M. TRow & J. COLEMAN, supra note 46, at 13.
67 Id. at 413; see also G. TYLER, supra note 22, at 281 ("Unions lack many of
the forms, traditions and practices of the American government. . . . Measured by the
Constitution ... union governments appear wanting in democratic fulfillment.").
68 L. SAYLES & G. STRAUSS, supra note 46, at 106; see also G. TYLER, supra
note 22, at 281-83 (arguing that few private governments, including corporations, uni-
versities, and churches, are democratic and that the primary purpose of a union is to
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may be attainable. "Responsiveness" of the union power structure to
membership pressure provides the best indicator of union democracy. 9
Sayles and Strauss concluded that despite oligarchical tendencies,
"taken as a whole there seems to be a good deal of democracy in the
union movement."
70
Union officials will be responsive, however, only if the member-
ship feels free to voice its concerns and discontent.7 1 Even Sayles and
Strauss recognized that their favorable conclusion applied only to situa-
tions in which "a member [who] attacks the officers in a meeting...
will not be subject to retaliation, ...regular elections are held, ...
nominations are free, . . . all are given a chance to vote, and . . . the
ballots are counted fairly."17 ' Thus, when fear and intimidation stifle
the union local membership's freedom of expression, "the most impor-
tant right" granted in the Landrum-Griffin Act, 7 no theory of union
democracy would deem that local to be democratic.
The concept of union democracy forms the core of the present dis-
cussion for two reasons. First, theories proposed by the government
when it seeks to impose a receiver on a union depend upon its claim
that members no longer control their union. 4 These suits require the
government to base its case on the democratic model incorporated in the
Landrum-Griffin Act. Second, the court directs the receiver to foster
democracy within the union.75 Landrum-Griffin, therefore, establishes
the government's cause of action and defines the goal it must achieve.
democratize the workplace).
This descriptive approach to democracy is not limited to labor unions. See Kirk-
patrick, Democratic Elections, Democratic Government, and Democratic Theory, in D.
BUTLER, H. PENNIMAN & A. RENNEY, DEMOCRACY AT THE POLLS 330, 334-48
(1981) (arguing that the term democracy "implies nothing" about the formal structure
of government and that a "constellation of values," including constituent participation
and the electoral process, must be included in the definition).
69 See L. SAYLES & G. STRAUSS, supra note 46, at 144; see also Summers, supra
note 43, at 106 (Even though incumbents are rarely defeated, union elections are im-
portant because "the improbable can and does happen ... responsiveness is encouraged
by the desire for self-preservation ... [and the tabulation of votes] measures the level of
discontent among the members.").
70 L. SAYLES & G. STRAUSS, supra note 46, at 168.
71 See W. LEISERSON, supra note 48, at 286 ("One outspoken critic is often
enough to hold officials to account and to prevent them from abusing their power.").
71 L. SAYLES & G. STRAUSS, supra note 46, at 150; see also G. TYLER, supra
note 22, at 275 (arguing that when members can freely "oust" their leadership, it is
unlikely that leaders will be able to co-opt the members).
7' Summers, supra note 43, at 99.
711 See infra notes 117-63 and accompanying text (discussing the government's the-
ories of trusteeships).
71 See infra notes 255-70 and accompanying text (discussing the goals of
receivers).
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II. RICO
The Landrum-Griffin Act cannot achieve its goal of union democ-
racy in a union captured by corrupt leadership. Criminal activities tem-
per Michels' Iron Law into high grade steel. Union officials intent on
using the union for illicit purposes and personal gain through embez-
zlement, fraud, and kickbacks, will not respond to members who desire
to clean up their union.e Indeed, such leadership will do everything
possible to crush any threat to its survival. For example, the secretary
of a Laborers' local was murdered shortly after resigning his post of
fifteen years to run against the incumbent president of the local.1
Aware of such criminal activities, legislators recognized that they had to
pass supplemental legislation to ensure that the democratic processes
promised in Landrum-Griffin were available in fact, as well as in
theory.
In 1970, Congress passed the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO")7 18 partially in response to a congressional
finding that the "money and power [of organized crime were] being
increasingly used to infiltrate ... labor unions."7'9 Despite earlier legis-
lation, this infiltration continued "in part because of the past inade-
quacy of remedies designed to deal with it."80 Senator McClellan spon-
sored the bill"1 and declared that the growing influence of organized
crime in labor unions made "a mockery of much of the promise of the
social legislation of the last half century." '82 To address part of this
deficiency, Congress included civil remedies in RICO. 3 These provi-
sions empower the United States district courts to issue orders, "includ-
ing, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of any
interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable re-
strictions on the future activities . . . of any person . . . or ordering
dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making due provision
7 6 Cf. W. LEISERSON, supra note 48, at 286 (noting that in order for corrupt
officials to succeed in controlling a union, they must be able to suppress member partic-
ipation). Members may not even know the extent of the corruption because the leaders
of the union control all access to information.
• See ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 17, at 11.
78 Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-68 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
11 Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 62 (1969) [hereinafter Measures].
80 Id.
8 See id. at 61.
82 115 CONG. REc. 5874 (1969).
8 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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for the rights of innocent persons." 4 Congress continues to recognize
that RICO primarily functions to supplement previous legislation and
increase the effectiveness of anti-organized-crime measures.8 5
A. How RICO Works
RICO is a complex statute.8 ' The Act does not make illegal any
action that was previously legal.87 The prosecution must, therefore,
prove a "confusing maze of elements"88 to show prohibited conduct,
namely engaging in a pattern of racketeering, 9 in order to avoid the
constitutional implications of either subjecting an individual to double
jeopardy0 or prosecuting her "based on [her] status."91
Section 196292 maps out this "confusing maze." Bolstered by the
civil remedies provided by section 1964, section 1962 makes it
unlawful:
(a) for any person... from a pattern of racketeering activity
(b) to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest
in or control of any enterprise ... [or]
(c) for any person employed by or associated with any enter-
prise . . . to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in
the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of
racketeering activity . . ..
In short, to prove a civil RICO violation, the prosecution must show
s4 id.
85 See 133 CONG. REc. E3351 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1987) (statement of Rep. Cony-
ers that before Congress passed RICO, the remedies available were too limited in both
scope and impact to deal with organized crime).
86 See Shepard, Horn & Duston, RICO and Employment Law, 3 LAB. LAW. 267,
268 (1987).
87 See Blakey & Goldstock, "On the Waterfront": RICO and Labor Racketeer-
ing, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 341, 348 (1980).
88 Id. The Supreme Court has also recognized the complexity of the statute. See
Sedima, S.P.L.R. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 500 (1985).
89 See Shepard, Horn & Duston, supra note 86, at 268.
90 See United States v. Persico, 774 F.2d 30, 32 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that
double jeopardy does not prohibit a RICO trial based upon conduct resulting in prior
convictions when that conduct continued for four years after the indictment).
11 Shepard, Horn & Duston, supra note 86, at 268 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5)
(1982)). Section 1961(5) states that a "'pattern of racketeering activity' requires at
least two acts of racketeering activity .... ." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982). The possible
consitutional violations raised by criminal RICO provisions are not central to this dis-
cussion of civil remedies under that statute, but they do explain the intricacy of the
statute.
92 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982).
9 Id.
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that a person participated in an enterprise through a pattern of racke-
teering activity. 4
The definitional section of RICO, section 1961," provides road
signs for the map presented in section 1962. Under RICO, a "person"
is "any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial in-
terest in property."9 6 An "enterprise" is "any individual, partnership..
. or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated
in fact although not a legal entity.197 Courts recognize labor unions as
"enterprises" under the statute." The last element of a RICO case re-
quires that the "person" must have been involved with the enterprise
through a "pattern of racketeering activity." To show a pattern, the
prosecution must prove that the defendant committed two acts of "rack-
eteering activity." 9 These two acts are known as "predicate acts."' 00
The statute enumerates acts that constitute racketeering activity. 01 In-
cluded are threats or acts of murder, bribery, extortion,102 and "any act
which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186
(dealing with restriction on payments and loans to labor organizations)
or section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds). 103
In order to invoke the civil remedies provision of RICO in the
labor context, the prosecutor must show that an individual or group of
individuals (an entity) exists. She must also show that this group par-
ticipates in or conducts'0 the affairs of the union (the enterprise)
through the performance of at least two of the enumerated predicate
" See Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 87, at 350.
95 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
98 Id. § 1961(3). The definition of "property" for the purposes of the statute is
very broad. See infra notes 122-25 and accompanying text (discussing intangible
property).
Id. § 1961(4).
98 See United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267, 270 (3d
Cir. 1985) (stating that the union was "an enterprise within the meaning of RICO"),
cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986); cf United States v. Boffa, 688 F.2d 919, 923 (3d
Cir. 1982) (labor leasing business considered to be an "enterprise" under RICO), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1022 (1983); United States v. Kaye, 556 F.2d 855, 861 (7th Cir.)
(noting that the union was the "enterprise" in which the defendant was involved), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 921 (1977).
99 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982).
100 See Blakey & Goldstock, supra note 87, at 354; Shepard, Horn & Duston,
supra note 86, at 269.
101 See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
102 Extortion specifically includes Hobbs Act violations. See id. § 1951; id.
§ 1961(1)(B).
103 Id. § 1961(1)(C).
104 Id. § 1962(c) ("It shall be unlawful for any person ... associated with any
enterprise ... to conduct or participate ... in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity . . . ."). In addition, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)
(1982) makes it a RICO violation to conspire to violate section 1962(c).
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acts.
United States v. Local 560, International Brotherhood of Team-
sters 05 provides an example of corrupt union practices. In that case,
the court found that eleven defendants, members of the "Provenzano
Group,"108 not only conspired to acquire and maintain control of Local
560, but did so "through a pattern of racketeering activity . . . . in-
volv[ing] murder and the systematic use of extortion. 1 0 7 The Group,
intent on dominating the local, murdered a popular union trustee be-
cause he threatened its control.108 The Executive Board then appointed
the brother of the individual who ordered the murder to fill the vacant
trustee position. 19 The Board also rewarded one of the murderers with
money and another with a position of power in the union. 0 Two years
later, someone murdered a union member on the morning after he
voiced opposition to the appointment of a business agent. No one was
ever convicted for the murder.""
Not surprisingly, "there has not been any publicly voiced opposi-
tion or dissent within Local 560 since the 1965 election,"11 2 even
though there were "repeated appointments to union office by the Exec-
utive Board of known or reputed criminals.""1 3 During that time,
courts convicted members of the "Provenzano Group" of numerous
union-related crimes, including practicing extortion, accepting kick-
backs in connection with union loans, and receiving "labor peace"
10 581 F. Supp. 279 (D.N.J. 1984), affd, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986).
108 See id. at 283. The individuals involved were business agents, trustees, fund
trustees, secretary-treasurers, and presidents of the local. See id. at 285.
107 Id. at 283-84. These individuals demanded "labor peace" payments, see id. at
289, kickbacks from benefit funds, and were involved in murder, attempted grand lar-
ceny, threats to injure in order to collect a loan, see id. at 290, and counterfeiting, see
id. at 291.
108 See id. at 312. The murdered individual was a popular member of the local
and the only candidate to run unopposed in the election in which the Provenzano
Group took control. See id. at 306-07.
109 See id. at 285.
110 See id. at 307. One murderer was paid $15,000, and the other was made a
business agent. See id.
I'l See id. at 308.
112 Id. at 317. The court found a "pervasive climate of intimidation within Local
560." Id. at 313.
"" United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267, 284 (3d
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986). Salvatore Provenzano was appointed
business agent after the murder. Nunzio Provenzano was appointed business agent
three days after being convicted of making a payoff demand. Robert Luizzi became
business agent and Executive Board member despite having been convicted of felonious
assault and battery. Sal Briguglio joined the Board immediately upon his release from
prison, and Thomas Reynolds became business agent despite his conviction for felony
robbery and arrest for armed robbery, grand larceny, and two rapes. See id. at 284-85.
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payoffs."1 4 Normally, such occurrences would "almost universally ...
bring forth an organized opposition group . . . . [and if] violations of
the members' rights, the misuse of union funds or pension funds, the
extortion and bribery... doesn't bring forth a contested election, then
the only conclusion . . . is people are deadly afraid."' 5
In Local 560, the district court found that the "Provenzano
Group" existed and was an "entity" under Section 1961(c)."' The
"Group" not only participated in, but controlled the affairs of the en-
terprise, Local 560, by engaging in at least two predicate acts in viola-
tion of section 1962(b). These conclusions formed the basis of the
court's decision to impose RICO's civil remedies under section 1964.
B. Receivers Under RICO Part I: Finding Liability
The Supreme Court has directed the federal judiciary to read
RICO broadly: "[It is] an aggressive initiative to supplement old reme-
dies and develop new methods for fighting crime.""' In the spirit of
this pronouncement, and to fully effectuate the purposes of the Act, the
Justice Department has initiated suits against labor union leaders who
used patterns of racketeering activity to manage their union. These
suits seek to exorcise the corrupt influence of these officials by remov-
ing them from office and by then imposing judicially appointed receiv-
ers on the unions.1 8 As will be discussed below, these suits do not re-
present the first such intrusive action taken by the government with
regard to the internal affairs of labor organizations, or with labor rela-
tions in general." 9 There have been two theories used to impose trust-
ees on unions. One is based on internal union affairs, and the other is
based on public safety. This Section will summarize the short history of
114 See id. at 273-74.
Trial Transcript at 1609-10, United States v. Local 560, 581 F. Supp. 279,
279 (D.N.J. 1984) (No. 82-689) (testimony of Professor Clyde Summers).
118 See Local 560, 581 F. Supp. at 334-35; see also United States v. Local 30,
United Slate, Tile and Composition Roofers, 686 F. Supp. 1139, 1143-54 (E.D. Pa.
1988) (finding that there had not been a contested election in 20 years, that the union
had used violence to coerce employers into unionizing and to dominate union contrac-
tors, and that the union had sabotaged and vandalized non-union contractors). The
Executive Board of the Roofers Union had also spent over $1,000,000 in union funds
from which the union derived no benefit. See id. at 1158; infra notes 139-63 and ac-
companying text (discussing the government's theory in the Roofers case).
"" Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 498 (1985); see also supra notes
78-85 and accompanying text (concerning the purposes of RICO).
"" Courts have the power to impose a receiver on a labor union under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1964(a) (1982), which grants district courts the power to dissolve or reorganize any
enterprise. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
119 See infra notes 164-215 and accompanying text (discussing history of
intervention).
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receiverships under RICO and will describe the theories, standards,
and circumstances under which courts have imposed receivers.
The first case that imposed a receiver on a union under RICO
was Local 560.2' The court accepted the Justice Department's theory
that only a receiver could remedy the extortion by the union leadership
of the union members' right to a democratic union.121 Under this the-
ory, the rights of "freedom of speech and assembly" and "equal rights"
granted union members under the Landrum-Griffin Act122 constitute
intangible property rights.12 3 The union leadership can therefore extort
that "intangible property" in violation of the Hobbs Act.""' Because
Hobbs Act violations are predicate acts under RICO,125 the commission
of at least two acts of extortion of union members' intangible property
rights to a democratic union will permit the court to invoke the civil
remedies of RICO section 1964.
In Local 560, the Justice Department argued that "the various
forms of intimidation carried out against opponents of the Provenzanos,
in violation of section 1962(b), have silenced any dissension and en-
20 Local 560, 581 F. Supp. at 337 (imposing a receiver until the union could be
run democratically by the members).
121 For the facts of this case, see supra notes 105-16 and accompanying text.
122 See supra notes 29-42 and accompanying text (discussing Landrum-Griffin).
12I See Local 560, 780 F.2d at 281-82. A member can have a property right to a
democratically run union because the right is an entitlement granted by the govern-
ment. The courts view Landrum-Griffin as the expression of that grant. See infra note
124 and accompanying text.
24 The Hobbs Act makes it unlawful to "obstruct[] ... commerce... by robbery
or extortion." 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1982). Extortion of intangible property has been
considered a Hobbs Act violation since 1969. See United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d
1069, 1075 (2d Cir. 1969) (finding that "[tihe concept of property under the Hobbs Act
... is not limited to physical or tangible property or things, but includes, in a broad
sense, any valuable right considered as a source or element of wealth" (citation omit-
ted)), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1021 (1970); see also United States v. Nadaline, 471 F.2d
340, 344 (5th Cir.) (intangible property such as business accounts and unrealized prof-
its are protected by Hobbs Act), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 951 (1973). The Supreme
Court recently narrowed the applicability of the concept of intangible property. See
Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316, 320 (1987) (holding confidential business
information is property protected by mail fraud statute but the contractual right of an
employer to honest and faithful service is "too ethereal" to be included under the stat-
ute); McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2879 (1987) (finding mail fraud stat-
ute "clearly protects property rights, but does not refer to the intangible right of the
citizenry to good government"). Despite this narrowing, federal courts still interpret the
Hobbs Act as prohibiting the extortion of intangible property. See, e.g., Northeast
Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 689 F. Supp. 465, 474 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (reaf-
firming that extortion of intangible property constitutes a violation of the Hobbs Act,
even after McNally and Carpenter); cf. United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Team-
sters, 694 F. Supp. 1158, 1159 (D.N.J. 1988) (doubting that the Hobbs Act is as
limited in scope as the mail fraud statute and distinguishing McNally because "it is not
at all clear that that decision will be extended to the Hobbs Act").
"25 See supra note 124 (discussion of Hobbs Acts violations as predicate acts
under RICO).
19891
946 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
sured... a perpetual reign by the powerful few over the subdued rank
and file." ' 6 The court found this argument persuasive when it held
that extortion was possible not only by "direct physical assault ... but
by more sophisticated and indirect physical and economic threats.
1217
The court concluded that the numerous appointments of criminals to
union office,128 the murder of a member after he openly opposed the
leadership at a union meeting, the many convictions of union officers
on union related charges, and their reappointment after they served
their sentences, all created a "repressive atmosphere"'1 2 that extorted
the memberships' democratic rights.1 30
To remedy this extortion, the government urged the appointment
of a receiver "to serve in the capacity of the Local 560 executive board
until such reasonable time as the membership can freely nominate and
vote for new officers."1 31 Both the district and circuit courts accepted
the government's argument. Neither court accepted the union's argu-
ment that the trusteeship derogated the members' interests in their
union. 32 The district court found that a "substantial likelihood" ex-
isted that conditions in the union would not improve until the atmo-
sphere of "fear and intimidation" created by the Provenzano Group
was dispelled. 3 Because future criminal activity appeared likely to
cause irreparable harm,"" the court found it "necessary ... to remove
the current members of the . . .Board in favor of the imposition of a
trusteeship ...for such time as is necessary to foster the conditions
under which reasonably free supervised elections can be held.)
13 5
On appeal, the circuit court agreed that drastic action had to be
taken in order to remove the influence of the Provenzano Group.
L3 6
126 Memorandum of the United States in Support of its Request for a Preliminary
Injunction and the Appointment of a Receiver Pendente Lite at 6, United States v.
Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 550 F. Supp. 511 (D.N.J. 1982) (No. 82-689)
[hereinafter Memo in Support].
127 Local 560, 780 F.2d at 283. The court cited decisions concerning Hobbs Act
violations to support its conclusion that extortion could take place through "the creation
of indirect fear." Id. (citing United States v. Hedman, 630 F.2d 1184, 1194 (7th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981); United States v. Sander, 615 F.2d 215, 218
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 835 (1980)).
128 See id. at 278, 284-86; supra note 113.
129 Local 560, 780 F.2d at 278.
110 See id. at 283.
131 Memo in Support, supra note 126, at 1.
112 See Memo in Opposition, supra note 24, at 145.
123 Local 560, 581 F. Supp. at 336.
'14 See id. at 337.
135 Id.
118 See Local 560, 780 F.2d at 293 (finding that "even incarceration, much less
ineligibility to hold union office, does not prevent members of the Provenzano Group
from committing acts of extortion").
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The court applied the "abuse of discretion" standard to review the
remedy; it found that the imposition of a trustee fell within the broad
remedial scope of section 1964.37 The circuit court affirmed the district
court finding that the members had lost control of their union and that
the imposition of a trustee "protect[ed] rather than forfeit[ed] the mem-
bers' rights.
13 8
The above approach contemplates five separate considerations.
First the government must show the union leadership extorted its mem-
bers' democratic rights. Then, the court must find that restoration of
union democracy is possible only if the current officers sever all ties
with the union. The court must also conclude that the members alone
will be unable to restore a democratic order and that a trustee will
succeed in returning control of the union to the membership. Finally,
the court must find that the decree will not adversely affect members'
interests.
Protection of the public also provides an important motivation for
government suits to impose a receiver on a union. The case brought
against Local 30/30B of the Roofers Union in Philadelphia illustrates
this type of RICO suit."3 9 In this case, the court convicted thirteen
union officers of 152 counts of racketeering, RICO conspiracy, and
other predicate criminal acts.'40 The union officers committed these acts
in order to embezzle from the union's pre-paid legal services plan;"'
bribe various public officials, including municipal and state judges;"
2
extort payments from contractors;" 3 make collections for organized
crime;1" and defraud an insurance company through the mail."' 5 Be-
cause these charges were proved at a criminal trial, the defendants were
estopped from denying the allegations in the RICO suit."4
6
137 See id. at 295.
138 Id. at 296 n.39.
139 United States v. Local 30, United Slate, Tile & Composition Roofers, 686 F.
Supp. 1139 (E.D. Pa. 1988). This is not to say that the Justice Department was not
concerned about protecting the public in Local 560. The observation only highlights
the two distinct theories of liability being put forth.
140 See Memorandum of Law in Support of the Motion of the United States for a
Preliminary Injunction at 2-7, United States v. Local 30, United Slate, Tile & Compo-
sition Roofers, 686 F. Supp. 1139 (E.D. Pa. 1988) [hereinafter Motion for Injunction]
(citing United States v. Traitz, 646 F. Supp. 1086, 1087-88 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (grand
jury indictment of Stephen Traitz, Jr., business manager of Local 30/30B)).
141 See id. at 10.
143 See id. at 11.
143 See id. at 13.
144 See id.
145 See id. at 14.
146 See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(d) (1982) ("A final judgment ... rendered in favor of
the United States in any criminal proceeding.., shall estop the defendant from deny-
ing the essential allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent civil proceeding.
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The government constructed its case in Local 30 in three parts. 47
In the first segment, the government showed that the defendants, while
carrying out their illegal activities, "terrorized the construction industry
through countless acts of violence and intimidation . "...148 The gov-
ernment made this showing through the testimony of thirty to forty
victims of, or witnesses to, the criminal acts committed by the defend-
ants. For example:
A: [W]hat he [the business manager] did was he explained
what he would do to you if you were ... not a union shop.
Q. What did he say?
A. He ran down the procedure of what would happen.
Number one, they would take your ladder down off the job
and just stand you up on the roof.
Q. Were these things expressed at this meeting?
A. Yes, right over the Mike phone [sic] in front of a hundred
people... I don't know if this was the second or third - he
said "We would beat you with a baseball bat.". . . I remem-
ber those very clearly. 49
The government used this testimony to demonstrate that the union,
under this leadership, posed a considerable threat to public safety.
Based upon such evidence, the government asked the court to enjoin
permanently the recently removed leadership from future associations
with the union.
The second segment of the government's case argued that a clear
connection existed between the union and organized crime. Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation recordings of conversations in the union offices
provided the primary evidentiary source for this assertion. One state-
ment by the business manager, Stephen Traitz, Jr., to a collector of
gambling debts for the "Scarfo organized crime group"150 is particu-
larly revealing: "Make sure everybody knows I'm you're fuckin['] guy.
147 See Transcript of Trial at 3, United States V. Local 30, United Slate, Tile &
Composition Roofers, 686 F. Supp. 1139 (E.D. Pa. 1988) [hereinafter Local 30
Transcript].
""I Motion for Injunction, supra note 140, at 9. The trial court accepted this
claim. See Local 30, 686 F. Supp. at 1143-50 (findings of fact).
149 Local 30 Transcript, supra note 147, at 144-45.
1"0 See id. at 977. Nicodemo Scarfo took over the Philadelphia mafia in 1981.
Since then, there have been more than 30 mob-related killings. See Salholz & Sandza,
The Mob's 'Me' Generation, NEWSWEEK, May 9, 1988, at 25. Scarfo was recently
convicted of racketeering charges for mob-related activities that could send him to
prison for 55 years. See Lansberry, Clark & Cipriano, Scarfo and Associates Con-
victed, Philadelphia Inquirer, Nov. 20, 1988, at 22A, col. 1.
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Because I'm a little power around here . . . . But yo, if they know
you're in back of me, I'm unfuckin['] beatable. Do you know what I'm
sayin['] . . . ?"'I' Revealing a link to organized crime bolstered the
Justice Department's case in two ways. First, a Mafia connection un-
derscores the dangerousness of the union under its present leadership.
Second, the involvement of organized crime in the union makes it
"highly unlikely" that the union will "stop violating the law merely
upon the conviction of [the] union leader." '52
The third segment of the government's case showed that "it is ex-
tremely unlikely, if not impossible, for the union to remedy itself absent
government action in the form of a trusteeship."' 5 3 Proof in this portion
of the case depended primarily on expert testimony.'
The government's suit in the Local 30 case sought the appoint-
ment of a trustee to administer the affairs of the union.'55 This trustee
would "supervise the affairs of the union and act to rid the union of
corruption."' 56 The government asked for imposition of the trustee
"until such time as the Court is satisfied that free elections are possi-
ble.'1 57 Therefore, the government implicitly argued that the union
leaders failed to run the union in a democratic manner and that only
drastic governmental action could restore union democracy.
The court compared the union leadership's reign to terrorism.. 8
and found that the defendants had violated section 1962(c) and (d).'59
Three alternative remedies were considered and rejected. The court re-
fused to dissolve the union, "at least for now."' 60 Additionally, the
court rejected the government's request for a trustee by reasoning that
in order to succeed, the union must change its ways voluntarily.' Fi-
151 Transcript of Federal Bureau Investigation Tape 52 at 4, PH 183A-1934,
Oct. 10, 1985.
15 Motion for Injunction, supra note 140, at 27. The district court specifically
found that Scarfo, acting as the head of La Cosa Nostra in Philadelphia and Southern
New Jersey, put Traitz into power in the Roofers Union and authorized Traitz's use
of violence. See Local 30, 686 F. Supp. at 1157.
153 Local 30 Transcript, supra note 147, at 6.
154 See id.
115 See Motion for Injunction, supra note 140, at 30.
158 Id.
157 Id.
151 See Local 30, 686 F. Supp. at 1166.
159 See id. at 1165 (the defendants "have conspired to conduct, and have succeeded
in conducting, the affairs of the Roofers Union through a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity"). Section 1962(c) makes it "unlawful for any person ... associated with any enter-
prise . . . to conduct or participate . . . in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982). Subsection (d)
makes it a RICO violation to conspire to violate subsection (c). See id. § 1962(d).
160 Local 30, 686 F. Supp. at 1167.
181 See id. The court noted that union members are required to be loyal to their
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nally, the court rejected the alternative of a monitorship because it
would not sufficiently alter the union's method of operation. Instead,
the court imposed a "decreeship"' 62 to protect the democratic rights of
the union members.'
This discussion elucidates the two theories currently proposed to
justify the imposition of receivers on unions under RICO. The first
theory relies explicitly on a concept of union democracy by making the
members' loss of a democratic union the harm to be remedied. In this
framework, a receiver is necessary when union officers have extorted
union members' right to a democratic union through fear and intimida-
tion. The second theory focuses on the harm the public suffers at the
hands of corrupt unions and seeks to impose a receiver until the mem-
bers can effectively run the union themselves. This second theory im-
plicitly relies on effective union democracy as a means to protect the
public, and the Local 30 court recognized this theory in its decision.
Thus in both theories, union democracy is the fundamental reason for
imposing receivers on unions.
III. THE REMEDY
The above discussion focused on the problem of labor racketeering
and explained the underlying principles of the solution, namely the use
of receivers to restore union democracy. Two questions, however, re-
main. Will imposition of a receiver accomplish the desired goal, and, if
it can, under what circumstances should courts use the device of a re-
ceiver? This Part will address these questions in light of past uses of
receivers, the shortcomings and advantages of other possible remedies,
and the underlying union democracy concerns.
A. A History of Intrusive Intervention
Both federal and state courts in the United States have a history of
becoming deeply involved in the employment relationship, particularly
at the remedy stage of litigation. This Section discusses three examples
of this involvement to show under what circumstances courts have
deemed it necessary to become embroiled in the work place and to show
leadership and that a court imposed trustee would not command that loyalty. Further,
the court noted that "history" showed that such solutions "rarely worked in the politi-
cal world"; therefore, it was not proper to expect that it would work in a union. Id.
The court did not state the basis for this assertion.
162 See infra notes 235-41 and accompanying text (discussing the details of the
"decreeship").
16 See Local 30, 686 F. Supp. at 1173.
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what factors have contributed to the success or failure of judicial
intervention.
1. The First Union Receiverships
In the 1930s, state courts decided the first suits attempting to place
unions in receivership."6 4 Even before the Landrum-Griffin Act'65 and
RICO, 66 therefore, courts were willing to employ equitable powers in
recognition of the union members' interest in participating in and influ-
encing their union's affairs.
When the New York Supreme Court handed down Kaplan v. El-
liott in 1932, the "[p]recedents for placing labor unions under any such
sweeping control of receivers [were] very meager.' 1 67 The suits arose in
an effort to counter the corruption then prevalent in some local unions.
For example, in Kaplan, more than twelve members had been expelled
from the union because they had not only opposed Kaplan's leadership,
but had also tried to forge a coalition of opposition. 68 The imposition
of a receiver was considered a "drastic form" of judicial intervention.' 69
In general, courts hesitated "to interfere in the internal affairs of trade
union[s]"' 70 through the use of receivers because of the perception that
a union could not properly function while in receivership.' Courts
18 See Collins v. I.A.T.S.E., 119 N.J. Eq. 230, 182 A. 37 (Oh. 1935); Local 11,
Int'l Ass'n of Ironworkers v. McKee, 114 N.J. Eq. 555, 169 A. 351 (Oh. 1933); Chal-
ghian v. Local 617, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 114 N.J. Eq. 77, 169 A. 327 (Oh. 1933);
cf Mullins v. Local 641, Merchandise Drivers, 120 N.J. Eq. 307, 185 A. 51 (Oh.
1936) (supporting the equitable action brought by a court-appointed custodial receiver);
Kaplan v. Elliot, 145 Misc. 863, 261 N.Y.S. 112 (Sup. Ct. 1932) (dictum expressing a
willingness to appoint a temporary receiver of local union funds if the local had made
such a request).
165 The Landrum-Griffin Act was passed in 1959. See supra note 29 and accom-
panying text (discussing Landrum-Griffin).
188 Congress adopted RICO in 1970. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
1'7 Pressman, Appointment of Receivers for Labor Unions, 42 YALE L.J. 1244,
1248 (1933).
I"8 See id. at 1244. For other examples of union misconduct, see Robinson v.
Nick, 235 Mo. App. 461, 467, 136 S.W.2d 374, 377 (1940) (noting that after charges
were brought against business manager, dissenters were threatened with expulsion);
Sibilia v. Western Elec. Employees Ass'n, 142 N.J. Eq. 77, 78, 59 A.2d 251, 252
(1948) (election set aside by incumbent officers); Collins, 119 N.J. Eq. at 233-45, 182
A. at 40-45 (excluding members from equal participation in affairs of unions, requiring
kickbacks to retain jobs, and a finding that the officers stayed in power through the use
of fear and intimidation); Chalghian, 114 N.J. Eq. at 498, 169 A. at 328 (fraud re-
lated to a "paper local"); Mursener v. Forte, 186 Or. 253, 261, 270, 205 P.2d 568,
571, 575 (1949) (elections suspended and financial malfeasance).
169 Pressman, supra note 167, at 1244.
170 Id. at 1247 (citing Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit,
43 HARV. L. REv. 993, 1000 (1930)).
171 See Mursener, 186 Or. at 276, 205 P.2d at 577.
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therefore avoided the "harsh remedy" of a receivership and would "re-
sort to [it] ...only in extreme cases." 1 2
The high standards the courts placed on plaintiffs seeking this in-
trusive remedy reflect this reluctance. Courts imposed a receiver only if
the "ends of justice" so required7 3 or if there existed no remedy at
law.1 4 Courts applied these standards less stringently, however, if they
determined that restoration of "self-government" to the membership re-
quired a receiver.'75 This formulation of the standard was particularly
relevant in cases in which strong evidence existed that union officers
coerced or intimidated union members l"" or in which officials sus-
pended union meetings so that the members lost the opportunity to
voice their discontent. 177
It is unlikely, however, that courts would have imposed a receiver
simply in response to a terrified membership. At least one court saw
the function of a receiver as merely protecting union funds and not
becoming involved with the internal running of the union.178 In that
case, the plaintiffs specifically claimed the loss of "valuable property
rights in and to their respective memberships,"'7 9 but the court made
its award only to protect against "future dissipation of the funds and
property of the local union." 8 0 This conclusion indicates that the mem-
bers' rights were not the courts' primary concern.
Although a factor in the court's calculus, a person's rights incident
to union membership did not rise to the level of a property right. The
cases are significant, however, because they demonstrate the existence
of a common law doctrine adopted to protect a union member's demo-
cratic rights by intruding upon the internal affairs of unions.
2. The Teamsters Monitorship' 8l
The Teamsters Monitorship represents a second common law ap-
172 I-d.
' ' See Local 11, Int'l Ass'n of Ironworkers v. McKee, 169 A. 351, 353 (N.J. Ch.
1933).
See Robinson v. Nick, 235 Mo. App. 461, 480, 136 S.W.2d 374, 385 (1940).
17 See Mursener, 186 Or. at 276, 205 P.2d at 577.
178 See Collins v. I.A.T.S.E., 119 N.J. Eq. 230, 247, 182 A. 37, 46 (Ch. 1935);
Robinson, 235 Mo. App. at 481, 136 S.W.2d at 386.
177 See Local 11, 169 A. at 353-54.
178 See Robinson, 235 Mo. App. at 482, 136 S.W.2d at 386-87.
317 Id. at 466, 138 S.W.2d at 376.
180 Id. at 484, 138 S.W.2d at 388. Note that the Landrum-Griffin Act had not yet
been passed, and there was, therefore, no statutory entitlement on which the plaintiffs
could rely. See supra notes 122-24 (discussing intangible property).
11 See generally Cunningham v. English, 41 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 49 (D.D.C. 1958)
(reprinting the text of a consent order in which the court established a monitoring
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proach to the problem of vindicating union members' rights. The moni-
torship resulted from a suit initially brought by a small group of
Teamsters members to enjoin the union from holding its 1957 Interna-
tional Convention." 2 The plaintiffs claimed the injunction was neces-
sary to correct violations of the union's constitution and other illicit
practices.1 8 The court denied the preliminary injunction, and the con-
vention took place on time. A subsequent suit succeeded in enjoining
the newly elected officials from taking office, pending the outcome of
the litigation."8 4
The second suit resulted in a consent decree establishing a Board
of Monitors.1 85 The decree instructed the Monitors to make recommen-
dations, including constitutional amendments,1 8  the union could adopt
to improve internal union democracy, and to propose a model for local
bylaws.1 87 The Monitors, however, lacked the power to impose any of
their suggestions without either the consent of the Teamster's General
Executive Board or of the court.1 8 8 The Board of Monitors was not a
success. It "neither dealt effectively with corruption, instituted demo-
cratic procedures, amended the International constitution, nor imple-
mented a model code of local by-laws."189
The broad, nonspecific provisions of the decree,190 which were
necessary in order to reach an agreement between the parties, combined
with the non-binding nature of the Board of Monitor's recommenda-
tions, made it possible for the Teamster Executive Board to resist the
implementation of reform at almost every turn. 91 Although some re-
form succeeded, 92 the voluntary approach of the decree limited its ef-
committee to supervise the affairs of the Teamsters Union).
182 See Comment, Monitors: A New Equitable Remedy?, 70 YALE L.J. 103, 103
(1960). For a complete history and explanation of the monitorship, see M. Goldberg,
The Teamsters Board of Monitors: An Experiment in Union Reform Litigation, 30
LAB. HIST. (1989) (forthcoming).
18 See Comment, supra note 182, at 103.
1 See Cunningham v. English, 41 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2022, 2029 (D.D.C.), modi-
fied sub nom., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Cunningham, 41 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2044 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
185 See Cunningham, 41 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 50.
188 See id. at 50-51.
187 See id. at 50.
See English v. Cunningham, 269 F.2d 517, 522, 523 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 905 (1959).
189 Comment, supra note 182, at 119.
'90 The full text of the January 23, 1988 Consent Decree is reprinted in Cun-
ningham, 41 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 49-52.
191 See Comment, supra note 182, at 119 ("[A] nightmarish deluge of procedural
motions has complicated the basic dispute over the interpretation of the consent decree.
There [were] thirty five appeals from the district court and several petitions to the
Supreme Court.").
182 See id. (noting that successes were seen in the adoption of rules for elections,
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fectiveness and made the decree insufficient to overcome the defendant's
resistance to change."' 3
3. Administrators Under Title VII
In contrast to the Teamsters Board of Monitors, court-appointed
administrators under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964"'M have
enjoyed some marked successes. This experience under Title VII per-
tains to the present discussion because it involves judicial involvement
in the administration of the work place similar to that in the receiver
cases and the Board of Monitors. 9 In all three areas, the court-ap-
pointed official must disseminate information to the affected parties,
handle the day-to-day requirements of administering a decree, the fun-
damental purpose of which is to restructure the work environment, and
provide feedback and recommendations to the court.' 96 The lessons
learned in restructuring a work place under Title VII can be readily
applied to restructuring a union.
The first Title VII administrator case,'9 7 United States v. Wood
Lathers Local 46," s concerned the discriminatory membership prac-
tices of a local with exclusive jurisdiction over all metallic lathing and
certain other aspects of construction work in New York City, Nassau,
Suffolk, and Westchester counties.' 99 When plaintiffs brought the suit,
total union membership exceeded 1450, of which only four members
were black.200 The case resembles the Teamsters Board of Monitors in
that the administrator was adopted by consent decree.'' Unlike the
Board of Monitors, however, the administrator exercised authority that
the parties could not frustrate: "The Administrator shall decide any
the reinstatement of members who were expelled from the union, and the filing of
charges against some corrupt officials).
193 Cf Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 589 (1983) (When
discussing desegregation, "remedial approaches require courts to recognize that resis-
tance [to the proposed remedy] can weaken victims' rights and to consider strong mea-
sures to prevent or defeat that resistance.").
'" Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, 78 Stat. 241, 253
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
19 See supra notes 164-93 and accompanying text; see also M. Goldberg, Clean-
ing Labor's House: Institutional Reform Litigation in the Labor Movement, 1989
DUKE L.J. (forthcoming) (analogizing union institutional reform to Title VII
litigation).
"I See Harris, The Title VII Administrator, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 53, 55 (1974).
197 See id. at 58.
... 328 F. Supp. 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), affd, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert denied,
412 U.S. 939 (1973).
199 See id. at 431-32.
200 See id. at 432.
201 See Harris, supra note 196, at 58.
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questions or disputes ... arising under this Agreement ... decisions of
the Administrator shall be ... final.120 2 After a slow start, and with a
little encouragement from the court, the administrator implemented
nondiscriminatory referral practices, 203 issued new work permits,2 "
and resolved numerous disputes concerning the interpretation and im-
plementation of the decree.205
The court in United States v. Local 638, Enterprise Association
of Steam Pipefitters°" imposed a second successful administrator. The
court probably modeled its order in that case on the Local 46 decree,207
and thus provided that "the Administrator shall be empowered to take
all action[] . . . he deems necessary to implement the provisions and
ensure the performance of this decree."20 8 Further, the decree gave the
administrator specific goals and time targets for implementation.20 9
Within one year, the administrator increased the number of minority
workers from thirty-one, when the parties filed suit,2"0 to almost
900.2"' Thus the parties did not have "to return to the district court for
guidance.
'
1
2 12
When the court fails to grant sufficient power to its appointed offi-
cials, the results have been less favorable. In United States v. Local
638, Enterprise Association of Steam Pipefitters,213 the court gave its
appointed board a narrower mandate than that awarded to earlier ad-
ministrators. With only the power to "validate and administer a job-
related test to applicants, 21 4 the board made no significant progress in
202 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting the consent decree, United States v. Wood,
Wire & Metal Lathers Local 46, 2 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 10,226 (S.D.N.Y.
1970)).
203 See id. at 65. As a result of the union's failure to adopt equal employment
opportunity procedures in accordance with the requirements of the consent decree, the
court established a 47 day deadline for the Administrator to present revised rules and
procedures. See Local 46, 328 F. Supp. at 440-41. The Administrator responded by
implementing new rules and a computer system that would produce periodic printouts
to allow him to monitor union hiring activity. See Harris, supra note 196, at 65.
204 See Harris, supra note 196, at 66.
2'0 See id. at 67.
206 360 F. Supp. 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
207 See Harris, supra note 196, at 62 n.44.
20 Id. (quoting the consent decree, United States v. Local 638, Enter. Ass'n of
Steam Pipefitters, 6 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 8176 at 5173 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)).
209 See id. at 62, 68.
210 See id. at 68 n.82.
211 See id. at 68.
212 Id. (footnote omitted).
212 347 F. Supp. 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). This case is related to the case of the same
name mentioned above, see supra note 206 and accompanying text, but it actually in-
volves Local 40 of the Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers Union.
214 Harris, supra note 196, at 61.
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two years of work.215
The above discussion demonstrates that courts have not been re-
luctant to devise broad intrusive remedies in the employment context.
The early receiver cases, however, show that a court will impose this
type of remedy only when it is determined that such measures are the
sole antidote to a serious harm. As the failed Teamster Monitor experi-
ment and the experiences under Title VII administrators illustrate, the
court must grant its appointees sufficient authority and provide appro-
priate guidance for a decree to succeed. If the court refuses to vest an
administrator or receiver with the minimum power necessary to achieve
the ends of the decree, the court's intrusion will be for nought.
B. Receivers Under RICO Part II: An Appraisal
Current experience under RICO shows that the federal courts
have learned some lessons from the past but have ignored others. As
will be seen below, courts have not fully accepted that trustees ap-
pointed under RICO must be endowed with sufficient authority to
carry out their mandate successfully. Courts have also failed to articu-
late a clear standard of appropriateness for imposing a trusteeship.
The imposition of a receiver or trustee is one type of equitable
remedy. Courts normally prefer another type of equitable remedy, the
negative injunction.21 A negative injunction will not always "secur[e]
complete justice,12 17 however, and the court should not be inhibited by
judicial preference in cases in which a positive injunction is necessary.
On the other hand, intrusive remedies such as receivers and trustees
implicate many concerns. The court should, therefore, safeguard the
interests of as many of the affected parties as possible when it formu-
lates its decree.218 This is particularly true in RICO. cases because the
court will not simply make the union democratic by judicial fiat. The
relief ordered must look to the future and attempt to satisfy a broad
range of interests. Among the most important of these interests is that
2 5 See id. at 63-64.
216 A negative injunction is an order prohibiting a specific action of the defendant.
See Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Le-
gitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 649-50 (1982).
21I Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) (quoting Brown v.
Swann, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 497, 503 (1836)); see also Goldstein, A Swann Song for
Remedies: Equitable Relief in the Burger Court, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 62
(1978) (arguing that the intrusiveness of a remedy must be understood in the context of
the actions of the parties and should not be judged solely by looking at the substance of
the decree).
21 See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281, 1293 (1976); Fiss, Foreward: The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1,
48-49 (1979); Fletcher, supra note 216, at 654-55.
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of the union membership in running its own union."' As discussed
above, the goal of a receivership is to restore union democracy when
corruption has undermined it.
From the earlier discussion of the cases in which parties sought
receiverships and courts appointed receivers under RICO,22 ° the con-
clusion that a receiver or trustee will be necessary in some instances is
unavoidable. When considering a decree including a receiver, courts
should keep in mind that "[i]n drafting Titles II through VI [of the
Landrum-Griffin Act], Congress was guided by the general principle
that unions should be left free to 'operate their own affairs, as far as
possible.' ",12 This principle can best be described as balancing the
public interest in fair and democratic union government against the
minimization of government intrusion on union autonomy.222 In a
RICO suit, when it has been shown that the members have lost control
over their union, this balance can best be achieved by imposing the
least intrusive remedy necessary to restore union democracy. The court
must then undertake an analysis of the current state of the labor organ-
ization and issue a decree that will provide sufficient guidance to ensure
a democratic union in the future.
The process of weighing interests to correct ongoing wrongs and
guide future behavior closely resembles both the legislative process
2 23
and quasi-administrative action.224 Merely because such behavior is
"non-judicial," however, does not make it presumptively improper for
the court to undertake such action.225 Action perceived as adversely af-
fecting organized labor's station, even in the name of protecting union
210 See Letter From Eric Neisser, Legal Director, ACLU-NJ, to Judge Harold A.
Ackerman (Dec. 16, 1987) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review)
(discussing the Local 560 trusteeship); see also Hinckle, Appellate Supervision of Rem-
edies in Public Law Adjudication, 4 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 411, 434 (1976) (The rem-
edy should "reach[] the most desirable accommodation of all the interests involved.").
Indeed, when courts impose a trustee, they emphasize the strong interests of the mem-
bers. See supra notes 121-25 and accompanying text (discussing property rights to de-
mocracy in unions).
220 See supra notes 105-63 and accompanying text (discussing current RICO
cases).
221 United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 117 (1982) (citing S. REP.
No. 1684, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1958)).
222 See Brennan v. Local 122, Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 564 F.2d 657,
660 (3d Cir. 1977) (describing how Title IV should be construed).
223 See Chayes, supra note 218, at 1297 (noting that "[flact evaluation" of this
nature by courts recalls the traditional description of legislation).
224 See Harris, supra note 196, at 63 (describing functions and attributes pos-
sessed by quasi-administrative agencies similar to those of courts engaging in this
process).
225 See generally Chayes, supra note 218 (concluding that the involvement of the
court and judge in public law litigation is workable, and inevitable if justice is to be
done in an increasingly regulated society).
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members or society, would probably bring political pressures to bear in
the legislative or administrative arena. Such pressures could conse-
quently prevent the passage of a law or inhibit agency action and leave
the wrong unremedied. Judges are not so constrained. 2 Furthermore,
judges can tailor the scope of the remedy to the specific union and de-
fendants before them, and they can be more responsive than either a
legislative body or agency bureaucracy to the criticisms and grievances
of the union members and other interested parties.227
Though the judiciary has several advantages over the legislative
and administrative processes in correcting these wrongs, it also has
some handicaps. The court's primary problem is access to informa-
tion.228 Admittedly, the court can utilize amicus briefs and expert wit-
nesses, open the courtroom to all interested parties, and partially rely
on the adversary process to overcome this infirmity. 29 One cannot as-
sume, however, that the court will be exposed to all concerns, particu-
larly in the labor racketeering context. The fear of reprisal will deter
victims, witnesses, and other concerned parties, including union mem-
bers, from coming forward, 30 thus creating a Catch-22 situation. In
order to formulate a remedy that will return control of the union to the
members, the court should consider the interests, concerns, and views of
the members; however, the factors causing the loss of union member
control make it virtually impossible for the court to gain the members'
input.
Despite this difficult situation, the court must attempt to fashion a
remedy. If there is extortion of union members' democratic rights, or a
significant threat to the public's safety, a court can take any number of
possible steps. 23' Initially, the court could simply enjoin the extortion
and other illicit activity and order supervised elections to replace those
union officers with criminal records. In such an election, unfortunately,
the agents of those responsible for the RICO violations probably would
again take control of the union. 2  A further drawback arises if it is
226 See id. at 1308. But cf. id. at 1307-08 (despite the appointed judge's theoreti-
cal insulation from political pressures, the reality of our legal system makes it unlikely
that any judge is completely isolated from the political process).
22 See id. at 1308.
228 See id. at 1310-12 (discussing the endemic incompleteness of the representation
of affected parties in public law litigation).
229 See Fletcher, supra note 216, at 655-57; Goldstein, supra note 217, at 46-48.
220 See Measures, supra note 79, at 112, 161; infra note 241 and accompanying
text (discussing fear of a union contractor and his failure to report threats to police).
21 See Goldstein, supra note 217, at 64-68 (describing the increasingly intrusive
steps generally available to the court).
22 See supra notes 105-15 and accompanying text (noting the ongoing appoint-
ments in Local 560); see also Memorandum in Support, supra note 126, at 4-6
("When the person is convicted of a crime and completes his sentence, then he begins
[Vol. 137:929
RICO RECEIVERSHIPS
suspected that the criminal activity continued after the issuance of the
order, and a new trial must take place on the issue of contempt.
Another possible remedy consists of a court order requiring the
government and the union to negotiate a remedial plan. This measure
also raises difficulties, however, because problems in interpreting and
implementing such a plan would probably reduce if not vitiate its effec-
tiveness. 233 A master appointed by the court to formulate a plan, with
no other authority or responsibility, would be at the same disadvantage
as the court in acquiring information. Furthermore, court decrees with-
out delegation of sufficient authority to judicially appointed officers
have historically failed.'"
Under this analysis, the decree imposed by the court in the Roof-
ers case will probably be ineffective. A court liaison officer whose au-
thority at this point is vague and undefined will administer the decree-
ship.23 5 In addition, although the decree states that no face-to-face
bargaining can take place unless the officer is present, it also prohibits
the officer from participating in the bargaining.2"6 Finally, union mem-
bers cannot outnumber employer bargaining representatives at any bar-
gaining session,237 and employers may refuse to negotiate over the
phone.238 A limit on the number of union representatives in a bargain-
ing session would not have helped the over one hundred contractors
present at the Rifle Club meeting when a small group of union leaders
imposed collective bargaining on a vast majority of the residential roof-
ers in the Philadelphia area. 3 9 The court does not address in its
decreeship the problem of enabling the "terrorized"24 victims of the
the process anew.").
233 See supra notes 192, 203 and accompanying text (discussing monitors and
court encouragement under first Title VII administrator).
23 See supra notes 193, 213-15 and accompanying text (discussing monitors and
Title VII failure).
215 Catherine Votaw, an Assistant United States Attorney, stated that the liaison
officer would probably have to return to court to define "the scope of decreeship au-
thority." Daily Labor Report (BNA) No. 101, May 25, 1988, at A-10. The officer
does have explicit authority to set the location of bargaining and must countersign any
collective bargaining agreement in order for it to be valid. Decree, United States v.
Local 30, United Slate, Tile & Composition Roofers, No. 87-7718 at 5-6 (E.D. Pa.
May 23, 1988) [hereinafter Decree]. The officer will also have access to all union
records. See id. at 7.
236 See Decree, supra note 235, at 6.
237 See id. at 7.
213 See id. at 6.
239 See supra note 149 and accompanying text (giving an excerpt of testimony
describing the Rifle Club meeting); see also United States v. Local 30, United Slate,
Tile & Composition Roofers, 686 F. Supp. 1139, 1144 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (findings of
fact concerning this meeting).
240 See Local 30, 686 F. Supp. at 1166 ("[T]he court found that the Union,
through the policies and practices employed by its leaders, engaged in terrorism.").
1989]
960 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
union leadership to exercise the rights they had prior to the decree.2 1
Why will individuals report incidents to the liaison officer that they
would not report to the police?
The only effective options, therefore, are greatly intrusive. Because
of their intrusiveness, it is of paramount importance that the court
adopt an appropriate analytical framework. The framework must ad-
dress not only the racketeering concerns embodied in RICO and the
union democracy concerns embodied in Landrum-Griffin, but also the
problems inherent in intrusive judicial intervention.242 The analysis
should consist of three distinct parts: 1) a determination of whether
RICO has been violated; 2) a determination of whether the union
members have lost control of their union to such an extent that they
will be unable to regain control without judicial assistance; and 3) a
formulation of the best remedy by determining whether a receiver
should be imposed.243 Each step requires a different balancing of the
interests involved. As the court proceeds from the first step in the anal-
ysis to the last, the importance of the public interest will decrease in
relation to the interests of the union membership. Whether RICO has
been violated is almost strictly a matter of public concern. The demo-
cratic state of a particular union is both a concern to the government
and to the individual members. Whether a receiver should be imposed
implicates the rights of the union members to a significantly greater
extent, as compared with the public interest at that stage.
Particularly disturbing is the use of the "preponderance of the evi-
dence" standard at the third stage of the analysis. The government
should have to prove the necessity of a receiver by more than the pre-
ponderance of the evidence. Unfortunately, the district court in Local
560 used,2 4 and the circuit court adopted,245 the less stringent stan-
dard. Both courts focused only on the defendants before them2 46 and
did not weigh the interests of those not present in the courtroom. If the
court had applied the proposed framework, it would have first used the
accepted "preponderance of the evidence" standard of proof to deter-
mine whether the defendants had actually violated RICO. The second
241 The court heard testimony from a union contractor who was beaten but did
not report the incident to the police "out of fear of the Roofers Union." Id. at 1152.
242 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
242 Owen Fiss argues that it is the courts' duty to effectuate the societal value
before it and that the remedy is "an integral part of that process." See Fiss, supra note
218, at 52-53.
244 See United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 581 F. Supp. 279, 327
(D.N.J. 1984), aff d, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986).
245 See United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267, 279
n.12 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986).
246 See infra notes 249-51 and accompanying text.
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step would have consisted of determining whether the membership had
lost control of the union. The proper source for evidence on this point is
neither the defendants nor the government: It is the union membership.
The union should, therefore, have independent representation at this
stage of the trial.24 The third step, using a higher standard of proof
that recognizes the union members' strong interest in running their
own union, should be to determine if the imposition of a trustee or a
receiver is the best method for restoring democracy to the union in
question.248
In its affirmance in the Local 560 case, the circuit court employed
a three factor balancing test to derive the appropriate standard of proof
for the imposition of the receiver.2 4 The stated purpose of this test was
to balance the private interest involved, the risk of error, and the gov-
ernment's interest in retaining the challenged procedure. The applica-
tion of this test included the weighing of the defendants', but not the
union members', interests.2 5 0 That the members have an important
stake in the outcome is evident from the court's analysis. The most sig-
nificant predicate act in the Local 560 case was the extortion of the
union members' intangible property rights to a democratic union.
RICO litigation in this area, including the Roofers case, attempts to
return control of the union to the members. The members' interests,
therefore, must be factored into the court's construction of the standard
of proof to ensure a just outcome. Of course, the court will still face the
problem of obtaining relevant information concerning the member's in-
terests, but the information problem in this context cannot be avoided
under any approach. The members' interest in running their own
union demands that a strict standard2 51 be met before a trustee, or some
other equally intrusive remedy, is instituted. Only by imposing this
17 See Chayes, supra note 218, at 1310-13 (discussing getting all interested par-
ties involved). In structural litigation, the judge should "make certain that he is fully
informed and that a just result will be reached." Fiss, supra note 218, at 24. This can
be accomplished by having the court appoint an attorney to represent the members.
248 This is not to say that Local 560 was wrongly decided. The point is to avoid
potential future abuses of RICO by utilizing an analysis that protects to the greatest
extent all interests involved in the proceeding before the court. Cf supra note 26 (dis-
cussing abuses of labor injunctions).
249 See Local 560, 780 F.2d at 279 n.12.
2 Both courts did find that the union members would not be harmed by a trus-
tee. See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text. This post hoc finding, made in
response to the defendant's argument, does not constitute a consideration of the mem-
bers' interest in the formulation of the burden of proof the government must meet in
order to have its requested order granted. The circuit court's omission of the members'
interests in its three part test indicates the actual formulation.
251 Cf supra notes 164-80 and accompanying text (discussing the standard of
proof state courts imposed in the early receiver cases).
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high standard of proof on -the prosecution can the court be sure that the
remedy is truly appropriate.
Once the court has determined that in order to protect the union
members' interests an intrusive remedy is warranted, it has a number
of options from which to choose. If the court must deal with a large
amalgamated union, such as Local 560,252 the court could divide the
union into smaller locals, based on contracts currently in effect. This
approach offers the advantage that democracy within the new unions
will be easier to achieve because there will be fewer members and a
smaller bureaucracy. The influence of all the factors leading to oligar-
chical control will be reduced.253 In addition, smaller unions will be
less likely to attract external corrupting forces because there will not be
as large an aggregation of funds.2" The disadvantage of this approach
is that it reduces the bargaining power of the members. Even though
the number of employees covered by each collective bargaining agree-
ment remains the same, the members lose power because the strike
funds and other support, such as the supply of picketers, become splin-
tered. A determination of the harm members would experience under
such a plan could be done on a case-by-case basis to determine whether
or not it is appropriate.
As implied by the discussion of Title VII administrators, 5 a
court-appointed official, such as a trustee or receiver, can avoid many
of the drawbacks of less intrusive methods. If given sufficient and un-
ambiguous authority, the receiver will be able to effect a change within
the union. A receiver or trustee can directly counteract a union's inher-
ent oligarchic tendencies by establishing new lines of communication
with members, diluting the strength of bureaucratic hierarchies, and
reinvigorating member interest and participation." 6 To this end, trust-
ees have employed methods including institution of procedures to guard
against misuse of funds, commencement of craft meetings, and publica-
tion of union newspapers. Receivers should also contemplate a gradual
252 Local 560 has collective bargaining agreements with over 400 companies. See
Memorandum in Opposition, supra note 24, at 12. It negotiates on both a single- and
multi-employer basis. See id. at 1.
"' See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text (discussing effect of size on
union democracy).
254 See, e.g., Measures, supra note 79, at 2 (noting that the enormous union
wealth tempts La Cosa Nostra).
25 See supra notes 194-215 and accompanying text (discussing successes under
Title VII).
25 Professor Alice Cook has argued that an increase in member participation and
interest could reinvigorate the viability of local unions by overcoming concentrations of
power. See Cook, supra note 48, at 348-49; cf. supra notes 57-60 and accompanying
text (discussing average attendance at union meetings as an indicator of member
participation).
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return to democracy. The first elections under a receiver should not be
for positions at the head of the union. Instead, the receiver should hold
local steward elections first, and then gradually move up the union
heirarchy. In this way, members will become reaccustomed to partici-
pating in union politics. Without one large election as a focus, corrupt
elements will find it more difficult to take control. Further, a number
of competing political power bases may develop, thus increasing the
possibility of a free exchange of ideas among union members. Because
member participation and freedom of communication provide essential
counterbalances to oligarchic tendencies, a trustee's ability to implement
measures encouraging both, coupled with her interest in doing so, leads
to the empowerment of union membership. This, after all, is the pur-
pose of RICO trusteeship litigation. 57 Senator McClellan expressed
the theory behind this remedy when he said, "if you would give to the
individual members of the unions the tools with which to do it, they
would pretty well clean house themselves." 58 And by implication, keep
it clean.
Furthermore, the receiver will not only be deeply involved in the
union, but also be responsible for it. Thus the receiver will be able to
limit the Catch-22 of unobtainable information and can provide the
court with further guidance concerning the ability of the members to
control their union. Receiverships can be imposed in varying degrees of
intrusiveness. In a small union, or in a union that the court determines
is just beyond control of its members, the court could impose a trustee
solely to administer and reform the various union funds. Once a trustee
removed the monetary incentive for organized crime to infiltrate the
union, the court could order a supervised election. Then, after a wait-
ing period sufficient to determine whether the corrupt influences have
been removed through the democratic process, the court could either
order the trustee removed or increase the trustee's responsibility to
managing the entire union, as in Local 560.
The experience of the Local 560 trusteeship shows that a union
can operate effectively under a court's order. The first trustee increased
membership in the union by twenty-eight percent in less than one
year. 59 The second trustee successfully supervised two strikes26° and
157 See supra notes 131, 138, 162-63 and accompanying text.
258 105 CONG. REc. 6476 (1959), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 13, at 1102; see G. TYLER, supra note 22, at 275 ("The more democrati-
cally run the union is, the more is the leader bound to reflect the opinions of his
constituency.").
259 See United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 126 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
2190, 2191 (D.N.J. 1987).
20 See Status Report from E. Stier, Trustee, to Judge Harold A. Ackerman at 5
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filed claims for $1.5 million in employer underpayments to union
funds.2"1
Nevertheless, the trustees do not merely serve to run the union;
they ultimately aim to return control of the union back to the members.
At the present time, there has been no demonstrated success in this
endeavor. The first Local 560 trustee's status report makes no mention
of either a plan or progress.26 2 His successor has instituted procedures
to guard against misuse of funds,263 commenced craft meetings, 64 and
instituted a union newspaper,265 all of which will probably promote
member participation. The trustee notes, though, that members remain
"[un]willing to become actively involved .. . if it means challenging
someone who has [previously] been in power in the Union."266 In addi-
tion, complications arise because the only politically active group in the
union backs the former president and has allegedly undertaken a cam-
paign to suppress any criticism of the last administration. 2" The cur-
rent trustee would not propose a "long-term" plan to return control of
the union back to the membership until January 31, 1988,28 nearly
twenty months after the trusteeship was established.
The current problems within Local 560 may be the result of the
informational Catch-22 described above: If the court had more availa-
ble information when it issued its order, it could have enjoined a
greater number of individuals from participation in the union's affairs.
If this is true, and the trustee can initiate further investigations that
will remedy the situation,26 9 there is definite value in the imposition of
(Dec. 4, 1987), 581 F. Supp. 279 (D.N.J. 1984), affid, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985)
(No. 84-5333, 84-5334), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986) [hereinafter Status
Report].
261 See id. at 7.
212 See Letter from J. Jacobson, Trustee, to judge Harold A. Ackerman (Oct. 23,
1986), 581 F. Supp. 279 (D.N.J. 1984), affd, 780 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1985) (No. 84-
5333, 84-5334), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986).
262 See Status Report, supra note 260, at 6-9.
2" See id. at 12.
265 See id. at 11.
266 Id. at 13.
267 See id. at 15.
268 See Letter-Opinion and Order at 3, United States v. Local 560, Civ. Action
No. 86-0689 (D.N.J. Dec. 17, 1987). An election has been set for December 6, 1988,
but it is unclear how the election of union officers will affect the trustee. See Noble,
Vote Set to End U.S. Control of a Jersey Teamsters Local, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1988,
at B3, col. 1. The trustee will continue in, at least, an oversight capacity, See Raskin,
Teamster Local, Once Run By The Mob, Tries The Ballot Box, N.Y. Times, Nov. 20,
1988, at E6, col. 4.
269 See Status Report, supra note 259, at 9-11; see also United States v. Local
560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 694 F. Supp. 1158, 1191-92 (D.N.J. 1988) (granting
injunction prohibiting Sciarra and Sheridan from running for union office because of
continued association with the Genovese Crime Family).
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a trusteeship. This observation does not determine, however, when the
trustee's task is complete. As noted above, the best measure of union
democracy, and therefore membership control, is the responsiveness of
leadership to members' concerns. Given the absence of an elected union
leadership, the court will be unable to gauge "responsiveness" while
the trustee remains in place. The trustee will, however, be able to in-
form the court of when members are willing to speak out about their
concerns.170 In particular, members can voice their concerns about how
their union was run in the past in order to avoid these mistakes in the
future. When the union membership is willing to engage in this critical
self-examination, the trustee's job will be finished.
CONCLUSION
Corruption in the labor movement has existed for at least a cen-
tury. In that time, it has affected numerous industries, cities, unions,
and individuals. While studies estimate that organized crime controls
only three to four hundred locals out of the approximately 50,000 labor
organizations in the United States,2 7 1 the problem is serious, particu-
larly for those union members who live and work under the cloud of its
control.
Despite statutory protection, affected unions are incapable of self-
regulation. The assumption that a democratic process alone will suffi-
ciently empower union members to retake control of their union from
dictatorial and corrupt leadership has proved to be untenable. Democ-
racy can work in a one party system, but only when those who question
and challenge the leadership do so free from the fears of violence and
severe economic retaliation.
How can corrupt unions best be returned to their rightful own-
ers-the rank and file members? The Justice Department's intrusive
answer employs the civil remedies of RICO to impose a trustee. This
response conflicts with the traditional principles of labor relations in
the United States, and it is unsettling to think that the power of the
federal government is being used to take over private organizations.
Furthermore, it can be argued that the long-term effect of this type
of RICO suit may be to decrease the overall level of democracy in the
labor movement. A proliferation of RICO trusteeships could foster a
270 One commentator observed that the openness of the trustee-supervised cam-
paign helped to encourage opposition factions within Local 560. See Raskin, supra note
268, at E6, col. 3.
2171 See ORGANIZED CRIME, supra note 17, at 7-8.
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siege mentality among members of organized labor.2 2 William Leiser-
son argues that the union movement's tenuous existence provides an
incentive for members to grant their leaders greater power in order to
protect their union.2 7- The government's continuing attempts to place
unions in receivership may increase this perception. RICO's require-
ment that the prosecution name an enterprise, invariably the union,
exacerbates the problem because it fosters the impression of government
attacking organized labor. This "siege mentality" phenomena under-
scores the importance of the judiciary clearly articulating the reasons
and standards for imposing a trustee. Only by making it clear to union
members that corruption, and not organized labor, is the target of
RICO litigation can the government and the courts avoid exacerbating
the very problem they seek to correct.
Despite its unattractiveness and its dangers, however, a receiver,
or other similarly intrusive remedy, is the only solution to corrupt un-
ions. Because of the potential dangers, the courts must take care to im-
pose such a remedy sparingly and only after the prosecution has met
the highest standard of proof. Receivers must only be used to correct a
serious wrong, not to wage an undeclared war on the labor movement.
272 See G. TYLER, supra note 22, at 283 (noting that the primary purpose of a
union is to engage in conflict and therefore is akin to a "garrison state").
273 See W. LEISERSON, supra note 48, at 75 ("The deep-rooted feeling of insecu-
rity which pervades the unions keeps them on a war basis, and it would be surprising if
their governments were continuing to grow more democratic in spite of the militancy
engendered by fears for the safety of the organizations."). Gus Tyler argues that autoc-
racy fulfills a societal demand for responsible union leadership that controls the mem-
bers to ensure orderly labor relation. See G. TYLER, supra note 22, at 285; see also J.
HARDMAN, AMERICAN LABOR DYNAMICS 111 (1928) ("Any method that points to-
ward a possible increase in the power of the [union] is the right method . . . ."), cited
in G. TYLER, supra note 22, at 272; cf. R. MICHELS, supra note 1, at 357-63 (arguing
that war stifles democracy).
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